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Abstract. Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science. However, in 
recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have 
failed to replicate, suggesting that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.” For philosophers, 
the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to do work on several fronts, 
including conceptual analysis, history and philosophy of science, research ethics, and social 
epistemology. This article introduces philosophers to these discussions. First, I discuss precedents 
and evidence for the crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and social-structural 
factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues raised by the 
crisis. Finally, I discuss several solution proposals and highlight the gaps that philosophers could 




Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science: we trust scientific 
findings because experiments repeated under the same conditions produce the same results. Or so 
one would expect. However, in recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, 
and biomedical sciences have failed to replicate (i.e., when independent researchers repeat the 
original experiment they do not obtain the original result.) The failure rates are alarming, and the 
growing consensus in the scientific community is that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.”  
Why should we care? The replicability crisis undermines scientific credibility. This, of course, 
primarily affects scientists. They should clean up their acts and revise entire research programs to 
reinforce their shaky foundations. However, more generally, the crisis affects all consumers of 
science. We can justifiably worry that scientific testimony might lead us astray if many findings 
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that we trust unexpectedly fail to replicate later. And when we want to defend the epistemic value 
of science (e.g., against the increasing charges of partisanship in public and political discussions), 
it certainly does not help that the reliability of several scientific fields is doubtable. Additionally, 
as members of the public, the high replication failure rates are disappointing as they suggest that 
scientists are wasting taxpayer funds. 
For philosophers, the replicability crisis also raises pressing issues. First, we need to address 
deceptively simple questions, such as “what is a replication?” Second, the crisis also raises 
questions about the nature of scientific error and scientific progress. While philosophers of science 
often stress the fallibility of science, they also expect science to be self-corrective. Nonetheless, 
the replicability crisis suggests that some portions of science may not be self-correcting, or, at least, 
not in the way in which philosophical theories would predict. In either case, we need to update our 
philosophical theories about error correction and scientific progress. Finally, the crisis also urges 
philosophers to engage in discussions to reform science. These discussions are happening in 
scientific venues, but philosophers’ theoretical work (e.g., foundations of statistics) can contribute 
to them. 
The purpose of this article is to introduce philosophers to the discussions about the replicability 
crisis. First, I introduce the replicability crisis, presenting important milestones and evidence that 
suggests that many fields are indeed in a crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and 
social-structural factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues 
raised by the crisis. And finally, I discuss solution proposals emphasizing the gaps that philosophers 
could focus on, especially in the social epistemology of science. 
 
1. What is the Replicability Crisis? History and Evidence 
Philosophers (Popper, 1959/2002), methodologists (Fisher, 1926), and scientists (Heisenberg, 
1975) take replicability to be the mark of scientific findings. As an often-cited quote by Popper 
observes, “non-replicable single occurrences are of no significance to science” (1959, p. 64). 
Recent discussions focus primarily on the notion of direct replication, which refers roughly to 
“repetition of an experimental procedure” (Schmidt, 2009, p. 91). Using this notion, we can state 
the following principle: Given an experiment E that produces some result F, F is a scientific finding 
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only if in principle a direct replication of E produces F. That is, if we repeated the experiment we 
should obtain the same result. 
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to repeat an experimental procedure exactly. Hence, direct 
replication is more usefully understood as an experiment whose design is identical to an original 
experiment’s design in all factors that are supposedly causally responsible for the effect. Consider 
the following example from Gneezy et al. (2014). The experiment E compares the likelihood of 
choosing to donate to a charity when the donor is informed that (a) the administrative costs to run 
the charity have already been covered or (b) that her contribution will cover such costs. F is the 
finding that donors are more likely to donate to a charity in the first situation. Imagine we want to 
replicate this finding directly (as Camerer et al., 2018, did). Changing the donation amount might 
make a difference; hence, the replication would not be direct, but whether we conduct the 
replication in a room with grey or white walls should be irrelevant.  
A second notion that researchers often use is conceptual replication: “Repetition of a test of a 
hypothesis or a result of earlier research work with different methods” (Schmidt, 2009, p. 91). 
Conceptual replications are epistemically useful because they modify aspects of the original 
experimental design to test its generalizability to other contexts. For instance, a conceptual 
replication of Gneezy et al.’s experiment could further specify the goals of the charities in the 
vignettes, as these could influence the results as well. Additionally, methodologists distinguish 
replicability from a third notion: reproducibility (Peng, 2011; Patil et al., 2016). This notion means 
obtaining the same numerical results when repeating the analysis using the original data and the 
same computer code. Some studies do not pass this minimal standard. 
Needless to say, these notions are controversial. Researchers disagree about how to best define 
them and the epistemic import of the practices that they denote (See Section 3 for further 
discussion).  For now, these notions are useful to introduce four precedents of the replicability 
crisis: 
• Social priming controversy. In the early 2010s, researchers reported direct replication failures 
of John Bargh’s famous elderly-walking study (Bargh et al., 1996) in two (arguably better 
conducted) attempts (Pashler et al., 2011; Doyen et al., 2012). Before the failures, Bargh’s 
finding had been positively cited for years, taught to psychology students, and it had inspired a 
big industry of “social priming” papers (e.g., many conceptual replications of Bargh’s work). 
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Several of these findings have also failed to replicate directly (Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & 
Pashler, 2013; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013, Klein et al., 2014). 
• Daryl Bem’s extrasensory perception studies. Daryl Bem showed in nine experiments that 
people have ESP powers to perceive the future. His paper was published in a prestigious 
psychology journal (Bem, 2011). While the finding persuaded very few scientists, the 
controversy engendered mistrust in the ways psychologists conduct their experiments since 
Bem used procedures and statistical tools that many social psychologists use. (See Romero 
2017, for discussion.) 
• Amgen and Bayer Healthcare reports. Two often-cited papers reported that scientists from 
the biotech companies Amgen (Begley and Ellis, 2012) and Bayer Healthcare (Prinz et al., 
2011) were only able to replicate a small fraction (11%~20%) of landmark findings in pre-
clinical research (e.g., oncology), which suggested that replicability is a pervasive problem in 
biomedical research. 
• Studies on P-hacking and Questionable Research Practices. Several studies (Ioannidis et 
al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Ioannidis et al., 2014) showed how some 
practices that exploit the flexibility in data collection could lead to the production of false 
positives (see Section 2 for explanation). These studies suggested that the published record 
across several fields could be polluted with nonreplicable research.  
While the precedents above suggested that there was something flawed in social and biomedical 
research, the more telling evidence for the crisis comes from multi-site projects that assess 
replicability systematically. In psychology, the Many Labs projects (Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et 
al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration 2012) have studied a variety of findings and whether they 
replicate across multiple laboratories. Moreover, the Reproducibility Project (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015), studied a random sample of published studies to estimate the replicability of 
psychology more generally. Similar projects have assessed the replicability of cancer research 
(Nosek & Errington, 2017), experimental economics (Camerer et al., 2016), and studies from the 
prominent journals Nature and Science (Camerer et al., 2018). These studies give us an unsettling 
perspective. The Reproducibility Project, in particular, suggests that only a third of findings in 
psychology replicate. 
forthcoming, Philosophy Compass 
 5 
Now, it is worth noting that the concern about replicability in the social sciences is not new. 
What authors call the replicability crisis started around 2010, but researchers had been voicing 
concerns about replicability long before. As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, authors worried 
about the lack of direct replications (Ahlgren, 1969; Smith, 1970). Also in the late 1970s, the 
journal Replications in Social Psychology was launched (Campbell and Jackson, 1979) to address 
the problem that replication research was hard to publish, but it went out of press after just three 
issues. Later in the 1990s, studies reported that editors and reviewers were biased against 
publishing replications (Neuliep & Crandall, 1990; Neuliep & Crandall, 1993). This history is 
instructive and triggers questions from the perspective of the history and philosophy of science. If 
researchers have neglected replication work systematically, isn’t it unsurprising that many 
published findings do not replicate? Also, why hasn’t the concern about replicability led to 
sustainable changes? 
 
2. Causes of the Replicability Crisis 
Most likely, the replicability crisis is the result of the interaction of multiple methodological, 
statistical, and sociological factors. (Although it is worth mentioning that authors disagree about 
how much each factor contributes.) Here I review the most discussed ones. 
Arguably one of the strongest contributing factors to the replicability crisis is publication bias, 
i.e., using the outcome of a study (in particular, whether it succeeds supporting its hypothesis, and 
especially if the hypothesis is surprising) as the primary criterion for publication. For users of Null 
Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), as most fields affected by the crisis, publication bias 
results from making statistical significance a necessary condition for publication. This leads to 
what Rosenthal in the late 1970s labeled “the file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979). By chance, 
a false hypothesis is expected to be statistically significant 5% of the time (following the standard 
convention in NHST). If journals only publish statistically significant results, then they contain the 
5% of the studies that show erroneous successes (false positives) while the other 95% of the studies 
(true negatives) remain in the researchers’ file drawers. This produces a misleading literature and 
biases meta-analytic estimates. Publication bias is more worrisome when we consider that only a 
fraction of all the hypotheses that scientists test are true. In such a case, it is possible that most 
published findings are false (Ioannidis, 2005). Recently, methodologists have developed 
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techniques to identify publication bias (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simons, 2014; van Aert, Wicherts, 
& van Assen, 2016). 
Publication bias fuels a second contributing factor to the replicability crisis, namely, 
Questionable Research Practices (QRPs). Since statistical significance determines publication, 
scientists have incentives to deviate (sometimes even unconsciously) to achieve it. For instance, 
scientists anonymously admit that they engage in a host of QRPs (John et al., 2012), such as 
reporting only studies that worked. A particularly pernicious practice is p-hacking, that is, 
exploiting the flexibility of data collection to obtain statistical significance. This includes, e.g., 
collecting more data or excluding data until you get your desired results. In an important computer 
simulation study, Simmons et al. (2011) show that a combination of p-hacking techniques can 
increase the false positive rate to 61%. QRPs and p-hacking are troublesome because (1) unlike 
clear instances of fraud, they are widespread, and (2) motivated reasoning can lead researchers to 
justify them (e.g., “I think that person did not quite understand the instructions of the experiment, 
so I should exclude her data.”) 
Also related to publication bias, the proliferation of conceptual replications is a third factor that 
contributes to the replicability crisis. As discussed by Pashler and Harris (2012), the problem of 
conceptual replications lies in their interaction with publication bias. Suppose a scientist conducts 
a series of experiments to test a false theory T. Suppose he fails in all but one of his attempts; the 
only one that gets published. Then, a second scientist gets interested in the publication. She tries to 
test T in modified conditions in a series of conceptual replications, without replicating the original 
conditions. Again, she succeeds in only one of her attempts, which is the only one published. In 
this process, none of the replication failures gets published given the file-drawer problem. But still, 
after some time, the literature will contain a diverse set of studies that suggest that T is a robust 
theory. In short, the proliferation of conceptual replications might misleadingly support theories.  
A fourth contributing factor to the replicability crisis is Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
itself. The argument can take two forms. On the one hand, scientists’ literacy on NHST is low. 
Already before the replicability crisis, authors argued that practicing scientists misinterpret p-
values (Cohen, 1990), consistently misunderstand the inferential logic of the method (Fidler 2006), 
and confuse statistical significance with scientific import (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). Moreover, 
recently, the American Statistical Association explicitly listed the misunderstanding of NHST as a 
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cause of the crisis (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). On the other hand, there are concerns about the 
limitations of NHST. Importantly, in NHST, non-statistically significant results are typically 
inconclusive so researchers cannot accept a null hypothesis (but see Machery, 2012 and Lakens, 
Scheel, & Isager, 2018). And if we cannot accept a null hypothesis, then it is harder to evaluate and 
publish failed replication attempts. 
A fifth and arguably more fundamental factor that contributes to the replicability crisis is the 
reward system of science. A central component of the reward system of science is the priority rule 
(Merton, 1957), i.e., the practice of rewarding only the first scientist that makes a discovery. This 
reward system discourages replication (Romero, 2017). The argument concerns the interaction 
between the priority rule and the peer-review system. In present-day science, scientists establish 
priority over a finding via peer-reviewed publication. However, since peer-review is insufficient to 
determine whether a finding replicates, many findings are rewarded with publication regardless of 
their replicability. The reward system also contributes to the production of non-replicable research 
by exerting high career pressures on researchers. They need to fill their CVs with exciting, positive 
results to sustain and advance in their careers. This perverse incentive explains why many of them 
fall prey to QRPs, confirmation biases (Nuzzo, 2015), and posthoc hypothesizing (Kerr, 1996; 
Bones, 2012), leading to non-replicable research. 
 
3. Philosophical Issues Raised by the Replicability Crisis 
Psychologists acknowledge the need for philosophical work in the context of the replicability crisis: 
they are publishing a large number of papers with conceptual work inspired by the crisis. Some 
authors voice the need for philosophy explicitly (Spellman, 2015, p.894). Philosophers, with few 
notable exceptions, are only recently joining these discussions. In this section, I review some of 
the more salient philosophical issues raised by the crisis and point out open research avenues. 
The first set of philosophical issues triggered by the crisis concerns the very definition of 
replication. What is a replication? Methodologists and practicing scientists often use the notions of 
direct (i.e., “repetition of an experimental procedure”, Schmidt, 2009, p. 91) and conceptual 
(“repetition of a test of a hypothesis or a result of earlier research work with different methods”, 
Schmidt, 2009, p. 91) replication. Philosophers have made similar distinctions, albeit using 
different terminology (Cartwright, 1991; Radder, 1996). However, both notions are vague and 
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require further specification. While the notion of direct replication is intuitive, strictly speaking, no 
experiment can repeat the original study because there are always unavoidable changes in the 
setting, even if they are small (e.g., changes in time, weather, location, and participants.) One 
amendment, as suggested above, is to reserve the term “direct replication” for experiments whose 
design is identical to an original experiment’s design in all factors that are supposedly causally 
responsible for the effect. The notion of conceptual replication is even more vague. This notion 
denotes the practice of modifying an original experimental design to evaluate a finding's 
generalizability across laboratories, measurements, and contexts. While this practice is fairly 
common, as researchers change an experiment’s design, the resulting designs can be very different. 
These differences can lead researchers to disagree about what hypothesis the experiments are 
actually testing. Hence, labeling these experiments as “replications” can be controversial.  
Authors have attempted to refine the definitions of replication to overcome the problems of the 
direct/conceptual dichotomy. One approach is to view the difference between the original 
experiment and replication as a matter of degree. The challenge is then to specify the possible and 
acceptable ways in which replications can differ. For instance, Brandt et al. (2014) suggest the 
notion of “close” replication. For them, the goal should be to make replications as close as possible 
to the original while acknowledging the inevitable differences. Similarly, LeBel et al. (2018) 
identify a replication continuum of five types of replications that are classified according to their 
relative methodological similarity to the original study. And Machery (2019a) argues that the 
direct/conceptual distinction is confused and defines replications as experiments that can resample 
several experimental components. 
Having the right definition of replication is not only theoretically important but also practically 
pressing. Declaring that a finding fails to replicate depends on whether the replication attempt 
counts as a replication or not. In fact, the reaction of some scientists whose work fails to replicate 
is to emphasize that the replication attempts introduce substantive variations which explain the 
failures and list a number of conceptual replications that support the underlying hypothesis (for 
examples of this response, see Carney et al., 2015 and Schnall, 2014). The implicature in these 
responses is that the failed direct replication attempts are not genuine replications and the 
successful conceptual replications are.  
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The definitional questions trigger closely related epistemological questions. What is the 
epistemic function of replication? How essential are replications to further the epistemic goals of 
science? An immediate answer is that replications (i.e., direct or close replications) evaluate the 
reliability of findings (Machery 2019a). So understood, conducting replications serves a crucial 
epistemic goal. But some authors disagree. For instance, Stroebe and Strack (2018) argue that direct 
replications are uninformative because they cannot be exact and suggest to focus on conceptual 
replications instead. Similarly, Leonelli (2018) argues that in some cases, the validation of results 
does not require direct/close replications, and non-replicable research often has epistemic value. 
And Feest (2019) also argues that replication is only a very small part of what is necessary to 
improve psychological science, and hence, the concerns about replicability are overblown. These 
remarks urge researchers to reconsider their focus on replication efforts. 
Another pressing set of philosophical questions triggered by the replicability crisis concerns the 
topic of scientific self-correction. For an important tradition in philosophy, science has an 
epistemically privileged position not because it gives us truth right away but because in the long-
run it corrects its errors (Peirce, 1901/1958; Reichenbach, 1938). Authors call this idea the self-
corrective thesis (Laudan, 1980; Mayo, 2005). 
(SCT) In the long run, the scientific method will refute false theories and find closer 
approximations to true theories. 
In the context of modern science, we can refine SCT to capture the most straightforward 
mechanism of scientific self-correction, which involves replication, statistical inference, and meta-
analysis. 
(SCT*) Given a series of replications of an experiment, the meta-analytical aggregation of 
their effect sizes will converge on the true effect size (with a narrow confidence interval) 
as the length of the series of replications increases. 
SCT* is theoretically plausible but its truth depends on the social structural conditions that 
implement it. First, most findings are never subjected to even one replication attempt (Makel et al., 
2012). It is true that scientists have recently identified particular findings that do not replicate, but 
this is a tiny step in the direction of self-correction. If we trust the estimates of low replicability, 
these failures could be the tip of the iceberg, and the false positives under the surface may never 
be corrected. Second, the social structural conditions in the fields affected by the crisis (which 
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involve publication bias, confirmation bias, and limited resources) make the thesis false (Romero, 
2016). Now, the falsity of SCT* does not entail that SCT is false but requires us to specify what 
other mechanisms could make SCT true. 
We can see the concern about SCT as an instance of a broader tension between the theory and 
practice of science. The replicability crisis reveals a gap between our image of science, which 
includes the ideal of self-correction via replication, and the reality (Longino, 2015). We can view 
this gap in several ways. One possibility is that the replicability crisis proves that the ideal is 
normatively inadequate (i.e., cannot implies not-ought). Hence, we have to change the ideal to 
close the gap, and this project requires philosophical work. Another possibility is that the ideal is  
adequate, and the gap is an implementation failure that results from bad scientists not doing their 
job. In this view, the gap is less philosophically significant and more a problem for science 
policymakers. In favor of the first possibility, however, it is worth stressing that many scientists 
succumb to practices that lead to non-replicable research. That is, the gap is not due to a few bad 
apples but to systemic problems. This assessment invites social epistemological work. 
The replicability crisis also raises questions about confirmation, specifically regarding the 
variety of evidence thesis (VET). This thesis states that ceteris paribus varied evidence (e.g., 
distinct experiments pointing to the same hypothesis from multiple angles) has higher confirmatory 
power than less varied evidence. (This idea is also discussed in philosophy under the labels of 
"robustness analysis" and "triangulation.") VET has intuitive appeal and has been favorably 
appraised by philosophers (Wimsatt 1981; see Landes, 2018 for discussion.) Take, for instance, the 
case for climate change, which we take to be robust as it incorporates evidence from a variety of 
different disciplines. Nonetheless, VET is not uncontroversial (Stegenga, 2009). In the context of 
the crisis, the virtues of VET need to be qualified, given the concern that conceptual replications 
have contributed to the problem (see Section 2). Since the 1990s, in line with VET, a model paper 
in psychology contains a series of distinct experiments testing the same hypothesis with conceptual 
replications. While such a paper allegedly gives a robust understanding of the phenomenon, the 
conceptual replications in many cases have been conducted under the wrong conditions (e.g., 
confirmation bias, publication bias, and low statistical power), and are therefore not trustworthy 
(Schimmack, 2012). In these cases, having more direct replications (i.e., less varied evidence) 
could even be more epistemically desirable. Thus, the replicability crisis requires us to evaluate 
VET from a practical perspective and determine when conceptual replications confirm or mislead.  
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Another concern that the replicability crisis raises for philosophers has to do with epistemic 
trust. Science requires epistemic trust to be efficient (Wilholt, 2013). But how much should you 
trust? Scientists cannot check all the findings they rely on. If they did, science would be at best 
inefficient. However, in light of the replicability crisis scientists cannot be content trusting the 
findings of their colleagues only because they are published. Epistemic trust can also lead 
consumers of non-replicable research from other disciplines astray. For example, empirically-
informed philosophers, and specifically moral psychologists, have relied heavily on findings from 
social psychology. They also need to clean up their act. (See Machery & Doris, 2017, for 
suggestions on how to do this.) 
While the issues above are primarily epistemological, the replicability crisis also raises ethical 
questions that philosophers have yet to study. A first issue concerns research integrity to facilitate 
replicability. A second issue concerns the ethics of replication itself. Since the first replication 
failures of social psychological effects in the early 2010s, the psychological community has 
witnessed a series of unfortunate exchanges. Original researchers have questioned the competence 
of replicators and even accused them of ill-intent and bullying (Yong, 2012; Meyer & Chabris 
2014; Bohannon, 2014). What should we make of these battles? While the scientific community 
has the right to criticize any published finding, replication failures can impact on original 
researchers’ careers dramatically (e.g., affecting hiring and promotion.) Replicators can make 
mistakes too. In recent years, there has been a growing movement of scientists focused on checking 
the work of their colleagues. While the crisis epistemically justifies their motivation, it is also fair 
to ask, who checks the checkers?  
 
4. What to do? 
The big remaining question is normative: what should we do? Since the crisis is likely the result of 
multiple contributing factors, there is a big market of proposals. I classify them in three camps: 
statistical reforms, methodological reforms, and social reforms. I use this classification primarily 
to facilitate discussion. Indeed, there are few strict reformists of each camp. Most authors agree 
that science needs more than one kind of reform. Nonetheless, authors also tend to emphasize the 
benefits of particular interventions (in particular, the statistical reformists). I discuss some of the 
most salient proposals from each camp. 




4.1. Statistical Reforms 
Statistical reformists are of two kinds. The first kind advocates for replacing frequentist statistics 
(in particular, NHST). One alternative is to completely get rid of NHST and use descriptive 
statistics instead (Trafimov & Marks, 2015). A more prominent approach is Bayesian inference 
(Bernardo & Smith 1994; Rouder et al. 2009; Lee & Wagenmakers 2013). The argument for 
Bayesian inference is foundational. The Bayesian researcher needs to be explicit about several 
assumptions in her tests–assumptions that remain under the hood of NHST inference (Romeijn, 
2014; Sprenger, 2016). Additionally, Bayesian inference with Bayes factors (the most popular 
measure of evidence for Bayesian inference in psychology) gives the researcher a straightforward 
procedure to infer a null hypothesis. This is a great advantage when dealing with replication 
failures. In practice, however, authors disagree about how to specify the necessary assumptions to 
conduct Bayes factor analysis. 
The second kind of statistical reformist does not want to eliminate frequentist statistics but 
change the way we do frequentist statistics. There are philosophical motivations for this sort of 
reform. Long-run error control is a valuable goal of statistical inference, which is not clearly met 
outside frequentism. Hence, rather than replacing frequentist statistics, one may argue that we need 
to improve the way we use it (Mayo, 2018). The frequentist scientists have had tools in addition to 
p-values to make inferences that practitioners could incorporate. For instance, equivalence tests 
allow researchers to test for the absence of effects (Lakens, Scheel, & Isager, 2018). Another 
possibility is to move away from the dichotomous inferential approach of NHST and focus on 
estimating effect sizes and confidence intervals (Fidler, 2007; Cumming, 2012; Cumming, 2014). 
There are also practical motivations to preserve frequentist statistics and in particular NHST. 
For instance, Benjamin et al. (2018) in a 72 authors paper advocate for changing the p-value 
threshold from the conventional p<0.05 to the stricter p<0.005. While the authors acknowledge the 
problems of NHST, they argue that such a change would solve many of the problems that lead to 
low replicability (e.g., by making p-hacking and QRPs harder to work) and would be easy to 
implement. In response, other 88 authors argue for a more critical approach in which authors should 
be required to specify and justify the significance level that their project needs (Lakens et al., 2018). 
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While philosophers are less invested in developing new statistical tools, they can contribute to 
these discussions at least in three ways: (1) evaluating the arguments and tradeoffs involved in 
implementing statistical reforms (Machery, 2019b); (2) making foundational debates about 
statistical inference relevant and accessible to practitioners; and (3) studying how inference 
methods behave in different contexts, e.g., by using computer simulations (Romero, 2016, Bruner 
& Holman, 2019, and Romero and Sprenger, manuscript). 
 
4.2. Methodological Reforms 
The methodological reformist proposes to improve scientific practices more generally by going 
beyond mere statistics. One type of reform is explicitly anti-statistical. For instance, McShane et 
al. (2019) argue to make publication decisions considering statistical outcomes (e.g., p-values, 
confidence intervals, and Bayes Factors) as just another piece of information among other factors 
such as “related prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality, real-
world costs and benefits, and novelty of finding” (p. 235). In practice, however, it would be hard 
to implement alternatives like this because editors and reviewers are used to relying on statistical 
thresholds as heuristics to make publication decisions. 
The second type of methodological reform recommends making the scientific process more 
transparent. A popular movement with this aim is open science. The rationale of open science 
practices is to increase transparency by asking researchers to share a variety of products from their 
work, ranging from experimental designs to software and raw data. Open science is epistemically 
desirable (but see Levin & Leonelli, 2016). Specifically, in the context of the crisis, open science 
practices have the potential to increase replicability as they greatly facilitate replication work by 
independent researchers. 
The open science movement has also defended pre-registration enthusiastically. That is, 
uploading a timestamped uneditable research plan to a public archive. A pre-registration states the 
hypotheses to be tested, target sample sizes, and so on. Pre-registration greatly constrains the 
researcher degrees of freedom that make QRPs and p-hacking work. When authors submit their 
work to a journal, reviewers and editors can verify whether the authors did what they planned.  
While pre-registration increases transparency, we should not overstate its usefulness. First, pre-
registration does not fully counter publication bias as it does not guarantee that findings will be 
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reported (Chen et al., 2016). Second, pre-registration cannot be straightforwardly implemented in 
some research domains (Tackett et al., 2017). Two refinements on pre-registration are the 
Registered Reports (Chambers, 2013) and Registered Reproducibility Reports (Simons et al., 2014) 
publication models. In these models, scientists submit a research proposal to a journal before data 
collection, which is evaluated based on its methodological merits. The journal can give the proposal 
an in-principle acceptance (IPA), which means that the paper will be published regardless of its 
outcome (see Romero, 2018, for discussion). 
Various authors have proposed changing publication practices to address the problem that 
replications are not rewarded. As discussed in Section 1, having dedicated outlets for replication 
work has not worked in the past. The reason is likely that having replication work published in 
secondary venues gives the impression that such a work is not very important, and hence 
researchers would still relegate it. Instead, a more promising approach is opening the doors of 
prestigious journals for replication work (Cooper, 2016; Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman, 2014; 
Vazire, 2015). 
 
4.3. Social Reforms 
The social reformist argues that changes in statistics and methodology are insufficient to address 
the replicability crisis because they treat the symptoms and not the disease, namely the defective 
social structures of contemporary science. For the social reformist, it is too optimistic to expect 
scientists to follow good practices (in particular, to do replication work) if the right incentives are 
not in place. This is because science today is a professionalized activity. As such, scientists are 
constrained not only by the ethos of science but also by more mundane and arguably more forceful 
pressures, such as the requirement to produce many novel findings to have a career and continue 
playing the game. 
Social reforms attempt to align career incentives with statistical and methodological 
expectations. In particular, to incentivize replication work, multiple parties should intervene. 
Funding agencies can allocate funding specifically to replication projects (see Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research, 2016, for an example). Universities and departments can 
create positions in which replication work is part of the responsibility of the researcher, and they 
can adapt promotion criteria according to quality metrics rather than raw publication numbers 
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(Schönbrodt, Heene, Maier, & Zehetleitner, 2015). Such interventions would create conditions 
where researchers do not perceive replication as second-class work. 
Further questions that the social reformist asks concern the adequate design of epistemic 
institutions: What is the best way to divide cognitive labor to ensure that science produces novel 
findings but also replicable results? What are the different tradeoffs in terms of speed and reliability 
if we incorporate replication work as an essential part of the research process? Should all scientists 
in a community engage in replication work or only a selected group? Some authors answer these 
questions proposing different institutional arrangements (see Romero, 2018, for discussion) and 
this is an area ripe for social epistemological investigation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have reviewed core issues in discussions around the replicability crisis, including 
its history, causes, philosophical assessments, and proposed solutions. Many normative discussions 
about replicability focus on technical problems about statistical inference and experimental design. 
Philosophers with interest on the foundations of statistical inference and confirmation theory can 
play a more active role in them. But the replicability crisis is not exclusively (and not primarily) a 
statistical problem. As I have reviewed, we still need to clarify concepts about replication, 
understand how different practices impact on low replicability and study how to intervene in the 
social structure of science. In these respects, the crisis demands work from the perspectives of the 
history and philosophy of science, social epistemology, and research ethics. That is, for 
philosophers, the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to update our theories 
and make them relevant to practice. 
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